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The following is the keynote address delivered by Eric
Stein, in accepting EUSA’s fourth Lifetime Contribution
to the Field Prize, at EUSA’s 9th International Confer-
ence, April 1, 2005, Austin, Texas.
I WANT TO THANK MOST SINCERELY YOU, Mr. President, the Ex-
ecutive Committee and the members at large of this Asso-
ciation for granting me this significant prize.  I have a special
reason to appreciate it because I am the first lawyer so hon-
ored, following in the footsteps of three outstanding political
scientists—but I find myself in an unusual position of facing
a distinguished audience in which lawyers form a small mi-
nority.
It is perhaps natural that the award has made me look
back at my life and ask the question just what I have done to
merit this recognition—this may or may not prove an embar-
rassing inquiry, but more immediately, it has made me want
to talk about myself, an impulse I shall try to restrain, if not
completely suppress, in my remarks tonight.
When I became interested in European integration in the
late 1950s there was no EUSA, no specialized review – and
since I had been teaching international law, I found my home
in the American Society of International Law.  But when the
then editor-in-chief of the American Journal of International
Law accepted my piece on harmonization of law in the Euro-
pean Community, Professor Dickinson, an icon in the field at
the time, told me that my piece was interesting but it had
nothing to do with international law.  Today – things are dif-
ferent – I have my home in EUSA and there is a multitude of
specialized periodicals in the field. So much about myself.
Let me start with a quotation the source of which you
may or may not recognize:
[There is a form of society], in which several states
are fused into one with regard to certain common in-
terests, although they remain distinct, or only confed-
erate, with regard to all other concerns.  In this case
the central power acts directly upon the governed,
whom it rules and judges in the same manner as a
national government, but in a more limited circle.
Evidently, this is [not] a federal government, but an
incomplete national government, which is neither ex-
actly national nor exactly federal but the new word
which ought to express this novel thing does not exist.
While you contemplate the likely author, let me read one
more passage from the same source: “The human under-
standing more easily invents new things than new words, and
we are hence constrained to employ many improper and in-
adequate expressions.”
It may come as a surprise to you—as it has to me—that
the author is none other than the 19th century French aristo-
cratic traveler, Alexis de Tocqueville, describing one of the
categories of his model of composite states, and—what is
even more astounding—his prophesy of the predicament
which we have been facing in dealing with European inte-
gration.  This is what Professor Neil MacCormick has said
about the European Community:  “Here we have not merely
a new legal system, but maybe even a new kind of legal
system….  We have remained, as it were, bewitched with
the paradigm of the state and its law….”  We are “juristic
pre-Darwinians,” unwilling to welcome a new species, any
“novel interlopers into our judicial consciousness.”  In fact,
we still insist on translating solutions developed within the
state to the novel phenomenon and using state nomenclature.
This, in a sense, is a natural tendency since the state is, so to
speak, the only show in town if one looks for a model and
international law is of little help.
I shall mention some more or less egregious examples of
the “translation” conundrum. Take the word “demos.”
Demos, I am told by my colleague in classics, meant any-
where from 6000 to 13,000 Athenians, free and male, who
met in an assembly (Ekklesia), first in the Agora and later in
a place with the intriguing name Pnyx.  What, please tell me,
has this picture to do with the situation of the peoples in the
European Union Member States or with the non-existent
European people?  Yet demos and demoi have become em-
bedded in the vocabulary of EU scholarship.
Another—and perhaps more serious example—is the
term “identity.”  National identity in the ethnic-cultural-his-
toric-territorial sense, is—sociologists tell me—a well estab-
lished category.  But, the so-called “European identity,” to
the extent that it exists today, is an entirely different cup of
tea, and we should have another name for it. If nothing else
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EUSA Review From the Chair
John T.S. Keeler
The Internationalization of EUSA
IT IS AN HONOR BUT ALSO A WEIGHTY RESPONSIBILITY to serve as
Chair of EUSA. Fortunately, we have a very skillful and com-
mitted Executive Director, Joe Figliulo, who makes the job
seem far less daunting than it might otherwise be.  I would
like to begin my term by thanking Joe publicly for the quality
guidance he has provided to date and for his recent pledge to
remain with EUSA for the foreseeable future.  Thanks also
to my predecessor, George Ross, and to the other two Ex-
ecutive Committee members who stepped down in June,
Karen Alter and Jeff Anderson, from whom I learned a great
deal while serving as Vice-Chair over the past two years.  It
is reassuring to know that the ExCom and I will continue to
benefit from the formidable presence of Grainne de Burca,
Virginie Giraudon and Sophie Meunier, and that we will be
joined by such sterling colleagues as Liesbet Hooghe (our
new Vice-Chair), Frank Schimmelfenning and Amy Verdun.
It is the composition of our 2005-2007 ExCom that in-
spired the theme of this essay: the internationalization of
EUSA.  As a number of friends and colleagues have ob-
served, this is the first EUSA ExCom ever to include only a
single native-born U.S. citizen (me).  Only two other mem-
bers are based at U.S. universities, and both of them are
native Europeans (Meunier, from France, at Princeton;
Hooghe, from Belgium, at UNC).  A majority of our mem-
bers, the other four, are native Europeans based either in
Europe (de Burca, from Ireland, at EUI; Giraudon, from
France, at EUI; and Schimmelfenning, from Germany, at
Mannheim) or Canada (Verdun, from the Netherlands, at
Victoria).
This might seem curious to anyone taking a sufficient
break from following the rancorous debates over the EU
Constitutional Treaty to read the two-page Constitution of
our Association (available online at www.eustudies.org).  After
all, the formal title of our organization is the “European Union
Studies Association of the United States”  (emphasis added).
And the Preamble asserts that the “Association exists to de-
velop a community of persons in North America interested
in the EU and to raise the level of knowledge about the EU”
(emphasis added).
But as all EU scholars know, organizations often develop
in unanticipated ways.  The constitutional clauses that, in ret-
rospect, paved the way for the internationalization of EUSA
are those stipulating (Article II) that “Membership in the As-
sociation shall be open to all persons and institutions who have
paid annual dues” and that “the Executive Committee shall
be elected by the membership.”  (continued on p. 22)EUSA Review    Summer 2005   3
(continued from p. 1) the babble of 20 languages and the
prospect of Turkey’s admission to the Union makes a mock-
ery of any reliance on ethnicity or history.
In an interesting research project, the British sociologist
Yasemin Soysal examined how Europe is portrayed in school
books and debates about school curricula in the UK, Ger-
many and France, and her conclusion illuminates the prob-
lem.  She points out that what she calls European identity
differs considerably from the national type of identity which
is deeply rooted in histories, cultures or territories.  She found
that history schoolbooks may glorify Europe’s Roman, Catholic
or even Greek origins as remarkable European achievements;
but these origins are less and less offered within a religious
or ethnic narrative, and increasingly in the more abstract form
of the universal principles they contain; what holds Europe
together, in schoolbooks, she concludes, is a set of civic ide-
als and universalistic principles.
I would agree that these ideals and principles, along with
common expectations, European Union law, Walter Hallstein’s
“Rechtsgemeinschaft” and the drafting of an EU constitu-
tion, provide the foundation for an evolving identification with
“Europe”. In other words they provide the foundation for a
European identity, if I must use the term, in the absence of a
better word for a new phenomenon.
My third example of the translation problem is applying
the “democracy-accountability” concept to Union institutions.
I had my say on this subject some years ago.  Let me just
mention the approach taken in the recent draft Constitution:
that document incorporates the present form of the so-called
dual accountability, that is the accountability of Ministers in
the Council to national parliaments and the Commission ac-
countability to the European parliament elected by the peoples
in the individual Member States.  The accountability of Min-
isters to their parliaments remains illusory in most member
states, but the Constitution would have sought to increase the
role of the European Parliament as a means of improving
accountability.
In addition, however, the Constitutional text included three
other innovations: first, a “participatory model,” defined as a
structured, systematic dialogue between the institutions and
the civil society.  A spokesman for civil society argued that
this could either be a potential “milestone” for a change in
decisionmaking, or just “a blast of hot air” ending again in
mere consultation.  Professor Jo Shaw shared the latter skep-
tical view.  According to the second innovation, the national
parliaments would be given an opportunity to give their opin-
ion on proposed Union legislation, clearly an effort to ad-
vance the subsidiarity principle.  And finally, an elaborate
provision for a popular initiative aimed at inducing the Com-
mission to act where it has failed to act.
Lastly, in this litany of translation troubles, are the terms
“constitution” and “constitutionalizing.”  The use or misuse
of these concepts is startling.  I have seen references to
Constitutio Westphalica and a Westphalian constitutional
moment.  But let me go back just to the aftermath of World
War II—the halcyon days of international institution building.
The basic documents of international organizations founded
at the time, such as the International Labor Organization and
the World Health Organization are named “Constitutions.”
Allow me to mention a talk I gave back in 1955—just half a
century ago—while I was on the staff of the State Depart-
ment Bureau of United Nations.
I questioned the use of the term ‘constitutional’ with ref-
erence to the United Nations.  The U.N. – I said – was a
loose association of sovereign states in a world fundamen-
tally dominated by power considerations and we could not
analyze its problems in terms of an orderly community, oper-
ating under a rule of law.  Today, I would suggest a similar
caution in the current academic debate about
“constitutionalizing” the World Trade Organization.
The same year, in 1955, I was in a working group of
officials, facing a blank sheet of paper, with a mandate to
make a first draft of a basic document for a new interna-
tional organization which was to deal with the novel nuclear
energy problems.  This was at the time when the vision of a
new, post-war world order had begun to fade.  I don’t re-
member which one of us in the working group had the good
sense of calling the new creature modestly “an agency” and
its basic document a “statute” rather than “a constitution.”
The International Atomic Energy Agency was eventually
established in Vienna and it has emerged as an important
player in the nuclear nonproliferation campaign.
And this brings us chronologically to the birth of the judi-
cial “constitutionalization” saga in European integration.  It
is, to add a touch of drama (with a grain of salt) a story of a
dark conspiracy and outrageous collusion, engineered by a
coven of judges and lawyers against unsuspecting govern-
ments.  It started, you will recall, with a trivial controversy
over import duties – the notorious VanGend en Loos case –
which the Dutch court referred to the European Court.
In 1962-63 I was spending some months in Brussels with
the Legal Service of the Commission at the invitation of its
Director General, the brilliant and influential Michel Gaudet,
formerly of the Conseil d’Etat.  I was able to sit in the meet-
ing of the Legal Service lawyers that was to work out a
formal opinion of the Commission in the Van Gend case for
submission to the Court of Justice.  In the fascinating debate,
advocates of the “constitutional” approach argued with the
traditional internationalists.  I must confess that—looking at
the text of the Treaty—I did not see an alternative to the
internationalist position.  In the end, led by the Director Gen-
eral, the “constitutionalists” prevailed.  The conclusion, writ-
ten in the Commission brief and accepted by the Court, was
that it was the Court of Justice, not the national court, that
decides whether a Community Treaty provision had a direct
effect in the legal orders of the member states and the Court
would apply the most liberal criteria of interpretation:  the
spirit, general scheme and wording.  In the Court’s vision, the4     Summer  2005   EUSA Review
Community Treaty is not an ordinary treaty.  The Community
constitutes a new legal order “for the benefit of which the
states have limited their sovereign rights within limited fields,
and the subjects of which comprise not only member states
but also their nationals and that imposes obligations upon, and
confers rights upon individuals as part of their legal heritage.”
I do not know which one of the judges on the European
Court was the principal co-conspirator with the Gaudet-ca-
bal.  But at any event, it is the Commission rather than the
Court that deserves the credit (or the blame) for the basic
idea of “constitutionalizing” the EC Treaty, a move designed
to replace the international law canon with public law con-
cepts—all this on the basis of rather scant provisions of the
Community Treaty.
The result, as evidenced by subsequent European Court
decisions, has been to turn the broad Community Treaty ob-
ligations addressed to governments and the principles which
were to be implemented by the political institutions, into di-
rectly effective provisions enforceable by interested individu-
als.  The “vigilance of the individuals,” as the Court put it,
along with the reduction of the unanimity requirement in the
Council have made the common and the single markets a
reality.
The second act in the constitutionalization drama was
the equally well known Costa v. E.N.E.L. case.  It originated
in an obvious collusion between a Milan justice of the peace
and Costa, a local attorney, who hated the nationalization of
the public utility in his city.  Costa sued to question the payee
of his monthly electric bill and the justice of peace managed
to push the case before both the Italian Constitutional Court
and the European Court of Justice.  The European Court
seized this opportunity, passed up in Van Gend, to establish
the general principle of “precedence” of Community law over
national law and it claimed the last word in any conflict be-
tween the two legal orders. So, the broadly defined direct
effect of Community law in the national legal orders, the prin-
ciples of supremacy, preemption, and implied powers and the
crucial case law on foreign affairs powers—along with the
expansion of the unique system of judicial review and en-
forcement of Community law—have become the foundation
of the “supranational” or proto-federal legal order, so aptly
envisaged by de Tocqueville.
On this foundation the Court has built further constitu-
tional-type general principles, such as a broad definition of
European citizenship and the protection of basic human rights
of individuals against acts of Community institutions.  The
Court has fashioned its own human rights doctrine from the
constitutional traditions of the member states and from the
European Convention on Fundamental Rights.  Incidentally,
the Court’s solicitude for individual rights is in a stark con-
trast with its persistently restrictive interpretation of the
individual’s direct access to the Court.  This widely criticized
interpretation was to be partly “overruled” in the draft Con-
stitution.
In an expansive mood, the Court called the Community
Treaty a “constitutional charter,” and it tended to construe
the Community powers—and its own jurisdiction—quite
broadly in the early years when Community legislation was
scarce and there was a need to fill in the gap by judge-made
law.  It was criticized on that score.  There is some evidence
that as Community legislation multiplied, the Court has in-
clined toward a less expansive definition of Community pow-
ers in both the internal and external spheres of its activities;
but this assessment is contradicted for instance by the Court’s
more recent bold interpretations of gender equality.  Also, the
Court continued to fill in gaps in the Treaty system, for ex-
ample by the path-breaking holding on member state liability
for damages caused to individuals by member state breach
of Community law, and the liberal use of the concept of “co-
hesion,” and of the very general Treaty provision calling for
cooperation in the Community.  The Court’s jurisdiction has
been extended along with the competences of the Union by
successive amendments of the constituent treaties and it would
have been further expanded in the Constitution for Europe.
It is too early to estimate the impact of the principle of
subsidarity but it is interesting that only in October 2000, for
the first time in its history, the Court arguably struck down a
Community law for lack of Community competence.
So much for the constitutionalizing process which ap-
peared to reach its climax in the drafting of the treaty estab-
lishing a Constitution for Europe.  This is what the President
of the European Parliament, Josep Borrell Fontelles, had to
say about the magic of the word “Constitution” at the signing
of the document in Rome last October:
The word ‘Constitution’ … carries political and sym-
bolic weight.  We should stand by our choice of this
word, as we Europeans know how significant it is.
In the past, the word ‘Constitution’ has been a point
of departure when dictatorships have fallen.  It has
helped to bring a new dawn of democracy to Po-
land, to France, and to my own country, Spain, not
so very long ago.”
This is a telling explanation why the Europeans, having
created “a new thing” in de Tocqueville words, refuse to find
a truly new name for it even though it has features incompat-
ible with the standard pattern of a national constitution.  As a
treaty, it had to be ratified by all member states through na-
tional treaty making processes, and provided for a right to
withdraw from membership, and in its Part III, it dealt in
massive detail with policies and voting formulae.  But the
first and second Parts have all the trappings of a national
basic law.  The official title, “Treaty Establishing a Constitu-
tion for Europe” clearly distinguishes between the Treaty as
a form and Constitution as a substance (Lenaerts).  At the
end of the day, the European Council of the Heads of State
and Government recognized the inherent ambiguity and spokeEUSA Review    Summer 2005   5
of a “Constitutional Treaty.”
At any rate, the Constitution seemed to represent a new
phase in the half-a-century integration process which has
been marked by a persistent tugging, with the connivance of
the hesitant governments, at the umbilical cord that ties the
new creature to the international law “Grundnorm.”
In concluding, I shall take the liberty to lapse again into a
bit of personal musing.  There is in all of us a need for a
vision that would help us “escape the two-dimensional, stale
image of the world.”  For me, it was first the idea of the new
post-war international order centered on the United Nations.
As I mentioned earlier, I worked in the State Department
Bureau of United Nations (later significantly renamed the
Bureau of International Organization).  I started there in 1946.
By the early 1950s, I became disillusioned with the unfulfilled
vision of the UN.  At the same time, dispatches passing over
my desk reported about the novel, strange structure rising in
Luxembourg.  There is in all of us—as Dr. Freud tells us—a
longing for returning to the locale and dreams of our child-
hood.  To see my old Europe attempting to shed its old ways
for a new art of governance was an appealing prospect.
Clearly, these thoughts and feelings have been at the foun-
dation of my positive attitude toward European integration
for more than half-a-century.  Professor Trevor Hartley who
emphatically rejects the constitutionalist theory, has written
that I apparently was the first to put that theory forward.  Yet
it was the Court itself that first enunciated the theory in its
Van Gend and Costa opinions.  The basic concept has been
elaborated by scores of scholars, most recently by Professor
Daniel Halberstam in his captivating theory of “recalibration”
of the position in the Union of individuals as citizens, consum-
ers, officials, judges.
There has been, needless to say, articulate opposition to
such theories by realists, neo-functionalist and
intergovernmentalists of different hues. Clearly, the Union,
an evolving creature with an ambition for a self-referential
basis, does not fit readily into the crystalline, positivist, anti-
constitutionalist world.  I readily confess my membership in
the constitutionalist club—but with an important caveat.  I
expect that the Union will become a premier player in the
world arena but, I have consistently disagreed with the idea
of some “constitutionalists” that the Union will or should or
could become ultimately a centralized federation, a “super-
state.”  Professor Weiler has made the case against that goal
more forcefully than I could.  He points to the negative, ex-
clusionary features of such a form, to the absence of a truly
constitutional foundation and to the pervasive differences
between the peoples of the member states I mentioned ear-
lier.
The pressing issue of the day is the timely completion of
the ratification of the Constitution by all members; 11 of the
25 have opted for a popular referendum.  If extended delays
are expected, all or some member governments may agree
on a provisional application of some of the features of the
Constitution, such as the monitoring by the national parlia-
ments or a full empowerment of the new European Foreign
Minister and his group of diplomats.  This could be done by
legal instruments available in EU practice such as an interin-
stitutional agreement, or by an agreement under international
law.  The Intergovernmental Conference faced the possibil-
ity of [I quote] “one or two members” failing to ratify by June
2007 but the only solution it could think of was dropping the
problem into the lap of the European Council.  The Council
would then be faced with a number of more or less unenvi-
able options.  But that is a story for another day.
Let me conclude with thanking you again—also on be-
half of my wife Virginia who must share in this honor I could
not have achieved without her.  She was with me from Brus-
sels to Beijing, used the long waiting hours to broaden her art
historian’s knowledge and edited every word I’ve written.
Thanks again.
Eric Stein
Hessel E. Yntema Professor of Law Emeritus
University of Michigan Law School
The EUSA Review follows an annual calendar of
announcements and listings organized in four topic
areas: Winter (December 15): EU-Related Academic
Programs (degree or certificate-granting, worldwide);
Spring (March 15): EU-Related Web Sites (especially
primary sources such as databases, on-line publications,
and bibliographies); Summer (June 15): EU-Related
Organizations (academic and professional  associations
or independent research centers (such as think tanks)
with significant EU aspects in their missions); and Fall
(September 15): EUSA Members’ Research Notes
(current, EU-related, funded research projects). Send
brief announcements by e-mail to <eusa@pitt.edu> or
by mail to EUSA, 415 Bellefield Hall, University of
Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA. We reserve the
right to edit for length, and we cannot guarantee
inclusion in the listings. We do not accept unsolicited
e-mail attachments.6     Summer  2005   EUSA Review
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Teaching the EU Editor’s note: This column is written by members of
EUSA’s “Teaching the EU” Interest Section. For details
about the Section and how to join, please visit
www.eustudies.org/teachingsection.html. Teaching the EU to Europeans: How Can “old”
and “new” Europe be Brought Together?
Eileen Fuchs and Robin van der Hout
Introduction
NOT LONG AGO EUROPEAN LEADERS CELEBRATED the unification of
their continent beneath the Athens Acropolis.1 The signing
of the Constitution for Europe2 is a milestone of a develop-
ment which started more than fifteen years ago with the un-
expected fall of the Berlin Wall and the German reunifica-
tion. All European countries - but especially those in the East
of the continent - have hence been going through exciting
and sometimes troubling times. After the recent events in the
Ukraine it appears to be evident that these times are not over
yet.3 A “Unified Europe,” meaning the enlarged European
Union4 is not yet being proclaimed by EU leaders, and few
European citizens feel ready to give their full consent to this.
Moreover, public opinion polls clearly show that only a slight
minority regards themselves as being simply “Europeans”.
Indeed, most Europeans agree to be European only beside
their “true” nationality, i.e., for example, German, Dutch or
Irish. Overall, the spread of Euro-skepticism has become es-
pecially obvious in the negative outcome of the referenda on
the European Constitution held in France and the Nether-
lands. The question is whether and how these attitudes about
the Europe and its future impact the teaching of European
students from both East and West.
Students from “old” and “new” Europe - differences in
mentality
The students entering Universities this year were born in
1986 or 1987. For them, the division of the continent into
“East” and “West” is already a part of history and far less
formative than used to be the case. Students from the new
member states are especially familiar with the sermon of the
new and unparalleled chances supposed to be open to them.
However, most of them also experienced new insecurity and
the loss of the well-known. Still, the vast majority - especially
those accepting the challenge and going abroad - follow a
sober and unprejudiced approach. They want to achieve
something in life - better today than tomorrow.
Students coming from the old member states, however, often
have different priorities. Many of them grew up in social and
financial security and still presume that opportunities will be
open to them in the future.5 Due to their “Western” lifestyle,
they still know very little about their new neighbors in the
“East”, which suddenly emerged after the “iron curtain” dis-
appeared. Who of them, including the authors, is truly famil-
iar with the specific features of Slovenia and Slovakia or of
Lithuania and Latvia?
It seems that students from the “West” far less appreciate
the opportunities of an enlarged European Union. Their col-
leagues from the “East”, however, are often more resolute
and energetic, sometimes truly overwhelming their Western
counterparts in our view. Speaking more generally, the new
member states generally give new impetus to the old EU-15
and might even help the overly self-contented countries of
“old” Europe to rediscover their enterprising spirit.
European Institutions and the movement of students
What can the EU do to overcome those differences in
mentality and culture insofar as they constitute obstacles to
further integration? The institutions of the European Union
and also national bodies are very active in bringing young
Europeans together. For example, more than 1.2 million stu-
dents have participated in the well known ERASMUS-Pro-
gram since 1987.6 Nevertheless, it needs to be realized that
providing funds is not always sufficient. Students’ desire to
meet and learn from another must be fostered, they must be
given opportunities to acquaint themselves with one another.
Until recently, it appeared that citizens from the new mem-
ber states were eager to spend time in the old member states,
whereas vice versa, this was rather seldom the case.7 What
is more, students from the British Isles seemingly are not
interested in spending time in Germany or Austria, preferring
destinations in Spain and Italy.
What the European Union needs in order to improve the
described situation are more institutions designed to teach
the European project and to form a generation with a stron-
ger “European spirit”. One of these desired “melting pots”
already existing is the Institute for European Studies in
Saarbrücken. The oldest of its kind in Germany and second
oldest in Europe, our institute celebrated its 50th birthday in
2001. Its history reaches back to 1951, only six years after
the end of World War II, when students and lecturers from
France and Germany began to work, study and live together
on campus, thereby working towards another, but not less
important European unification. What lessons can be drawn
from these fifty-five years of experience when speaking of
students from “old” and “new” Europe and how to bring them
together?
Learning about Europe
The first lesson is that Europe only will be unified when its
citizens learn about it - together. Therefore, the starting point
must be the creation of a common basis of learning- a point
that is already problematic in itself. Educational systems and
learning methods vary greatly among Member States, with8     Summer  2005   EUSA Review
lines not simply dividing along East and West.8 The so-called
“Bologna Process”9 launched by the European Union aims
mainly at the harmonization of university degrees, but has
only indirect effect on the diverse methods of teaching. For
this reason, European Union studies have to identify and take
into account the major existing distinctions.
Speaking in a very general manner about the different ap-
proaches to learning, the “Southern” educational system, as
it can be found , e.g., in France or Italy, and even more so in
the new member states, is rather “scholastic,” allowing stu-
dents little flexibility and independence: Attendance of most
lectures is obligatory and students carefully follow and minute
the lecturers’ words. Acquiring a vast factual knowledge by
learning by heart is deemed to be a priority, whereas oral
contributions by students are not very common in most class-
rooms. Therefore, written exams sometimes mainly consist
of what was said in the lecture - word for word.
In the “Northern” educational system, as one may find it in
the Scandinavian Countries, the UK or Germany, students
are supposed to work in a far more autonomous manner.
Attendance of lectures is mostly expected but not obligatory,
students rather listen than take notes and often raise ques-
tions. This independence-encouraging approach of course
includes the risk of people remaining at university for years
without significant advancement and without the need to face
reality. Also, students more often than not feel left to their
own devices. Law students in Germany, for example, often
pay tuition to private institutions to help them prepare for
their final exams.
The only solution to this described clash of systems is to
create a well-balanced mixture allowing students to profit of
each of these systems’ strengths and to learn from each other.
Students from various backgrounds have a very different start-
ing ground in a one year master program at our institute, but
most all manage to adapt and succeed.  For example, during
the first days of lecture of every academic year, class is truly
divided. Some students literally stenograph of what is said -
others just sit and listen. When the students are called upon
to ask questions or give their own opinions on a certain topic,
some do and some wonder why they should. By the end of
the year, however, the “writers” become more relaxed and
participate in discussions and the “speakers” find out that it
can be helpful to also take some notes.
Furthermore, the need to combine methods is reflected in
the way exams are drafted, too. Most written exams are
devised using a twofold approach. First, questions are posed
which can be answered only by showing detailed knowledge
which could be drawn from the lecture. Second, students are
asked to analyze and solve cases, thereby applying the gen-
eral system of analysis that they were taught. Students from
the “Southern” system are especially apprehensive regard-
ing cases, finding them very difficult due to a lack of experi-
ence. People from the “North”, on the other hand, complain
about the unacceptable amount of detailed knowledge they
are expected to acquire. In the end, however, good grades
can be reached by students from both groups, without some
students having considerable advantages over others.
In short, teaching the European Union to a mixed group of
students from all member states requires considering differ-
ent educational systems, backgrounds and approaches to
academic learning. Only if the basic methods of each system
are combined in the system of teaching and design of exams
will it be possible to avoid giving a competitive advantage to
one group of students and allow all students to meet both the
demands of a common program. Comprehensive European
Union Studies also must consist of a workable mix of theory
and practice, which includes a mixture of teaching forms
addressing students’ different skills. Seminars and written
exams focus on research and autonomous writing, while case
studies and moot courts encourage students to test their prac-
tical and verbal skills. As a result, students acquire a recog-
nized and comparable Master degree, allowing them to com-
pete for professional positions on a level playing field with
graduates from other postgraduate programs in Europe.
Understanding each other
The second lesson that we can draw from our experience
is that Europe will only be unified when its people achieve a
better understanding of each other’s culture and mentality.
In addition to the comparable academic skills just described,
students must also learn to communicate with one another.
Indeed, This applies to relations between “East” and “West”,
as well as all Member States.
First and foremost, communication naturally stands for lin-
guistic skills. The enlarged European Union of 25 counts 20
official languages. All the same, only 45 percent of European
citizens can converse in a language other than their mother
tongue. There are, however, large variations among Member
States and population groups: While the aforementioned is
true for more than 80 percent of people living in the Nether-
lands, Denmark or Sweden, it applies to less than 30 percent
of the Portuguese or the British.10 The main reason for the
poor British result, of course, is the fact that the EU’s lingua
franca has become English - whether the French like it or
not. When asked which foreign language Europeans find most
useful, nearly 70 percent said it was English and only 37 per-
cent French, not to mention German, which was named by
only 26 percent of the respondents. In contrast, almost 80
percent have foreign language skills. Although promising, this
is still not sufficient, since the command of just one foreign
language is not deemed adequate for working and living in a
multi-national environment.
Therefore, language training has to be an integral part of
European Studies. Students should be given the opportunity
to follow lectures in different languages and courses to learn
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so, the focus should not only lie on English. A good knowl-
edge of the English language is so widely expected in the
Europe of today that it can no longer be considered as a
distinctive asset. On the contrary, its absence must be justi-
fied and generally is a true career obstacle. Due to this fact,
only the sound knowledge of another European language gives
students a clear advantage in the European professional world.
Of course, communication does not consist of language
only. In an enlarged and enlarging Europe, intercultural skills
are equally important. It goes without saying that it takes
more than words to understand another person. Adjusting to
other cultures is a complex task and cannot effectively be
taught in seminars, but needs to be practiced. Students need
to spend time abroad with people from other cultures.
The sometimes vast differences in mentality become ap-
parent, for example, in students’ attitude towards their teach-
ers. Generally speaking, students from the aforementioned
“Northern” educational system show more self-confidence
towards their lecturers and are often quite critical. This is
generally not the case with students from the “Southern”
system, which is based on a strict hierarchical structure and
does not allow much room for an equal dialogue. The latter is
also especially true for most students from the new member
states formerly belonging to the Eastern Bloc. From their
educational systems, especially since many of their teachers
grew up and were taught in communist times, these students
are used to discipline and compliance in a way that was widely
abandoned in Western Europe after the so-called cultural and
political revolution of 1968.
Concerning students from the new EU member states, our
experience shows that most of them appreciate a liberal at-
mosphere of studying, and that a lot of them leave with a
new-found self-confidence. However, there seem to be sig-
nificant differences in behavior between students from new
member states such as Poland or Hungary and those few
students from more distant countries, such as the Ukraine,
the Southern-Caucasus, Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan. The
latter usually arrive with a distinctive assertiveness about them
which can sometimes cause integrative difficulties. Often, it
seems that the very fact that they have the opportunity to
study in Western-Europe creates in them the impression of
being a kind of “elite”, which can result in a quite demanding
attitude.
All the same, of course, intercultural differences are fasci-
nating and learning about them is definitely firmly connected
to studying the European Union. Intercultural competence is
necessary, especially as differences can easily create sub-
stantial conflicts. A serious example is a Romanian and a
Hungarian student of ours getting into an actual fistfight over
the long standing geographic dispute between their two coun-
tries. This incident demonstrates that even if the EU contrib-
utes to formally settling conflicts between states, this does
not mean at all that its citizens are yet ready to follow.
In drawing a conclusion, we can state that an inherent part
of teaching the EU is teaching and fostering communication
by conveying language skills, as well as intercultural compe-
tence. Only if European students can learn to understand
each others’ mentalities is there a good chance that not only
member states, but also their citizen, can form “an ever closer
Union”.
How to bring students together
Europe can only be united while maintaining its diversity.11
The diversity of Europe becomes apparent not only in its
different cultures and languages, but also in the wide range
of topics European Union Studies generally cover, namely
the historical and political background of the Union as well as
its legal foundations. All in all, this constitutes an overwhelm-
ing range of subjects for a single student, which she or he
can only master by making choices. “Teaching” in this re-
spect entails helping to make these choices, while bearing in
mind that the complexity and coherence of EU matters mean
leaving out some issues and details, while not leaving any
substantial gaps in knowledge.
Therefore, a distinction needs to be drawn between the
basic knowledge obligatory for all students and specialized
knowledge which builds on that base and from which stu-
dents may choose. The basics certainly encompass the main
features of European History of the last century and the
evolvement of the process of European integration after World
War II. Further, it is necessary to give an overview of today’s
most important EU policies  and of the position of the EU in
the World.
Many specialized subjects are imaginable. All of the five
special subject areas taught at our institute are relevant for
students from old and new member states. However, it seems
that not all of those subjects enjoy equal popularity among
students in the two mentioned groups.  For example, the topic
“Foreign Trade” deals with economic globalization, interna-
tional trade relations and foreign investment. Remarkably,
students from the new member states take a greater interest
in this. The reason for this may be that all of them come from
rather small and economically weak states still exploring the
potentials of good trade relations and therefore having a spe-
cial need for well trained experts in this field. More or less
the same can be observed with regard to the study units “Eu-
ropean Management” and “European Economic Law”, which
focus on the economic activities of the European Union and
are of special interest to students aiming at a career in the
European or International business sector. While students from
the old member states are certainly also interested in these
subjects, it is striking that nearly all students from the new
member states choose to specialize in these areas.
On the other hand, the opposite is true for the study units
“European Media Law” and especially “European Protec-
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states dominate. What might be the reasons for this notice-
able allocation? The authors initially mentioned the sober and
unprejudiced approach of students from the East. Deducting
from this observation, there seems to be a close relation be-
tween students’ origin and their choice of specialization. Most
students from the new member states appear to perceive a
concentration on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
as a luxury they simply cannot afford yet. On the contrary,
“Westerners”, especially from the northern countries, appar-
ently strongly believe in the importance of the political and
moral implications of European integration Maybe it is true
after all what Bertolt Brecht wrote in his Three Penny Op-
era: First comes the feeding, then come the morals.
To formulate a last conclusion: European Union studies
should allow students to make their own choices. This cer-
tainly is one of the most attractive features of this subject
area. Interestingly, the different approaches towards EU-Stud-
ies - and perhaps also to the EU itself – are reflected in
choices made by students from East and West at our insti-
tute. Insofar as the chosen specialization has a common ba-
sis, this should be fostered. At the same time, however, all
students should have the opportunity and, what is more, should
be encouraged, to look into other areas of study that might
not interest them at first glance.
Notes
1 The Treaty of Accession of the ten new Member States
was signed on 16 April 2003 in Athens; it can viewed or
downloaded from http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/en-
largement/negotiations/treaty_of_accession_2003/
index.htm.
2 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (Official
Journal of the European Union, December 16th 2004, C
Nr. 310), signed in Rome on October 29th, 2004.
3 “Time to offer more to Ukraine during ‘birth of a new
European nation’”, in: European Voice, Vol. 10 Nr. 44, 16
December 2004.
4 Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia and Turkey are still (offi-
cial) candidate countries. All 46 European States with the
exception of Belarus are, however, members of the Coun-
cil of Europe in Strasbourg, France.
5 According to the results of “Jugend 2002, 14. Shell-
Jugendstudie”, young people in Germany look into the fu-
ture optimistically regarding their professional and mate-
rial position.
6  The ERASMUS-Program is today part of the
SOCRATES II-Program which runs until the end of 2006.
It has a budget of 187,5 Million Euros for 2004. Currently
2199 higher education institutions in 31 countries are par-
ticipating in ERASMUS. The program consists of many
different activities; student and teacher exchanges, joint
development of study programmes (Curriculum Develop-
ment), international intensive programmes, thematic net-
works between departments and faculties across Europe,
language courses (EILC), European credit transfer sys-
tem (ECTS).
7 As clearly shown by Commission statistical data, to be
found under: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/education/
programmes/socrates/erasmus/statisti/stat14.pdf.
8 Walter Müller/Wolfgang Karle „Social Selection in Edu-
cational Systems in Europe“, European Sociological Re-
view, 1993:9, issue 1, p. 1-22.
9 Bologna Declaration of 19 June 1999 envisaging the
establishment of a European area of higher education by
2010.
10 For more detailed information see the “Eurobarometer
54 Special - Europeans and Languages, Report produced
by International Research Associates (INRA - Europe)”
of February 2001.
11 The EU itself acknowledged this by introducing the
principle of subsidiarity with the Maastricht Treaty pre-
amble and today’s TEC Article 5.
Archive of European Integration  http://
aei.pitt.edu
THE ARCHIVE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (AEI) is an online
repository for non-commercial, non-governmental
publications (short monographs, working or policy papers,
conference papers, etc.) dealing with any aspect of
European integration. The AEI is hosted by the
University Library System at the University of Pittsburgh
with the co-sponsorship of EUSA and the Center for
West European Studies/EU Center, University of
Pittsburgh. All those who presented papers in person at
the 2005 EUSA Conference in Austin may post their
conference papers on the AEI.
Anyone can access and download materials on the
AEI. The search engine allows searching by author, title,
keyword, year, etc. The AEI editors invite all with
appropriate papers to submit them to the AEI. If you
wish to deposit papers in a series, you must contact the
AEI editor before beginning deposit of papers. With
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Michael Zürn and Christain Joerges (eds.). Law and
Governance in Postnational Europe:  Compliance be-
yond the Nation-State.  Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 297 pp.
IS LAW CONCEIVABLE BEYOND THE NATION-STATE?  Whether you
are a skeptic or believer, Law and Governance in
Postnational Europe will be one volume you will want to
read.  The authors in this edited volume answer with a re-
sounding YES – a theoretically rigorous and empirically rich
response that is particularly welcome (and assuring for those
interested in the future of EU constitutional and legal re-
forms) at a time when NO seems an increasingly popular
response in Europe.
The volume takes as its central focus the possibility of
transnational law and adopts a law and politics approach to
answer this question.  This is a wise strategy.   In the Euro-
pean Union, scholars and practitioners alike agree that to
understand EU politics today one must pay close attention to
the increasingly powerful linkages between law, courts and
society at the national and EU levels.  Similarly at the global
level, law is increasingly salient for understanding a myriad
of issues from trade disputes to individual rights politics.
Zürn, Joerges and colleagues answer the question
whether transnational law is possible by examining an equally
important and connected puzzle: what accounts for compli-
ance beyond the nation-state (p.2)?  The volume offers a
comparative analysis – across sectors and multiple levels of
governance – of compliance in Germany, the European Union
and the World Trade Organization (WTO).  The research
design is meticulous and rigorous, systematically examining
three levels of governance each across three different policy
areas: state aid, food regulations, and fiscal redistributive
policies.  Analytically the research project also contributes to
the growing, and very productive, collaboration we see flour-
ishing between lawyers and international relations scholars
– a multidisciplinary approach that is essential for understand-
ing world politics today.
Theoretically, the volume also moves beyond previous
compliance scholarship in two important ways.  First, the
authors look beyond the “problem-solving capacity” or simple
“effectiveness” of international rules and focus on the pro-
cess.  Compliance is thus understood by examining both policy
creation and then the subsequent impact on the regulation’s
application.  Second, and of even greater importance, the
research not only examines why governments comply or not
but also identifies key elements of democratically legitimate
forms of governance.  Thus, a crucial connection is made
between compliance rates and the construction of democratic
governance beyond the nation.  The democratic nature of
global politics is a crucial question of our time and the con-
tributors take a unique angle by focusing on the relationship
between democratic legitimacy and compliance.
The book’s main argument is provocative.  Good compli-
ance is not dependent on an administration or agent with a
superior availability of material resources.  In particular, high
compliance rates are not necessarily linked to two key fea-
tures of the nation-state: a monopoly on legitimate force and
a national identity embodying consent between regulations
and the individuals governed by them. This argument turns
on its head dominant theories of both law and international
relations that are highly skeptical of law beyond the nation-
state.  Testing a series of independent variables, the authors
assert that high compliance is linked to two general condi-
tions that are not necessarily bound by the state structure, but
instead may occur at various levels of governance from the
state to the global.  Adopting a rational institutionalist approach,
they argue that effective monitoring and enforcement mecha-
nisms are crucial for compliance.  Second, the case studies
also illustrate that a high degree of legalization – defined as
the degree of “juridification” and also “internalization” – of
both the polity and the policy leads consistently to higher com-
pliance rates (p.195).  This volume is both a complement to
and extension of the burgeoning literature on “legalization”
processes, and the authors’ great care in defining and speci-
fying this broad term is particularly welcome.  Interestingly,
the authors do test two other variables, legitimacy and man-
agement explanations, and find that while both clearly matter
to compliance and can assist in sustaining high rates, neither
are necessary or sufficient in securing better compliance.
Empirically, what is the most remarkable finding in the
case study chapters?  Again, these chapters empirically test
these compliance assumptions in the 3 policy areas (state aid,
food stuffs and redistributive policies) along 3 different levels
of governance (state, regional and global).  Is transnational
law possible, does compliance work beyond the national state?
In the authors’ own conclusions, “the winner is:  The EU.”
(p. 183).  This is significant, for both scholars and practitio-
ners who have viewed European integration skeptically or
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compliance mechanisms over those of their regional or inter-
national counterparts.  In Wolf’s chapter on state aid, the EU
is compared to both Germany and the WTO system, and the
EU compliance rate surpasses the other two regimes.
Neyer’s chapter on foodstuffs compares the EU and WTO
systems and similarly concludes the EU system of monitor-
ing, enforcement and successful litigation led to higher de-
grees of compliance.  In the final empirical chapter, intergov-
ernmental redistribution policies are compared in Germany
and the EU, and here too the EU comes out ahead – al-
though only slightly.  This case study is particularly striking as
the comparative analysis reveals almost identical findings
within these two redistributive arrangements from the range
of actors involved to levels of legal internalization – an obser-
vation that clearly challenges assumptions that redistributive
payments can only succeed within a national community.
The book does suffer a common ailment of edited vol-
umes: there is a less cohesive overall analysis and voice car-
rying through the theoretical exploration and empirical analy-
ses than one might hope for.  That said, this may be a product
of the ten year time period over which this collaborative
project between four scholars developed.  While the book is
concerned with examining multiple levels of governance, a
concern with the EU dominates the volume.  While the EU
focus is clearly of value, it does pose limitations to an equally
constructed comparison.   Further, while Joerges’ final chap-
ter on legal perspectives of compliance research offers a
cogent argument, it seems almost an afterthought in terms of
organizational placement, rather than having this very well
articulated argument developed throughout the volume.
But these setbacks are minor compared to the real value
of the book.  The volume’s core message will resonate loudly:
for us to understand compliance, the law and legal systems
more generally, we must “reconfigure” our disciplines to grasp
the theoretical, empirical and normative nuances that exist in
our global world today.  The authors use this perspective to
successfully rebuff compliance literature, turning a glass is
half empty argument into a theoretically and empirically strong
explanation of why the European Union has strong compli-
ance in comparative terms.  This multidisciplinary approach
is historically at the heart of European studies and will be an
asset for understanding both transnational law and the future
of European integration.  The other key lesson that makes
this book required reading for both EU scholars and EU con-
stitution builders, is the disconnect that can occur between
compliance with the law and democratic legitimacy – just
because we have one doesn’t ensure we have the other.
This is a lesson that is crucial for the democratic future of the
EU.
Rachel A. Cichowski
University of Washington
Milada Anna Vachudova. Europe Undivided: Democ-
racy, Leverage, and Integration After Communism.
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005, 360 pp.
EVEN IN THE MIDST OF POST-REFERENDUM UNCERTAINTY, such oth-
erwise opposite actors and opinion-makers as the European
Commission and the Economist agree on one thing: that en-
largement has been a highly successful policy and that - in
spite of the widespread uneasiness expressed in the referen-
dums and opinion-polls - it would be wrong to discontinue it.
Milada Vachudova’s excellent book tells us why. It not only
arrives at a highly positive evaluation of the impact of en-
largement in the accession countries but also at a cautiously
optimistic view on its consequences for the EU. This well-
organized book is essential reading for the specialist but its
high accessibility and broad scope also make it suitable for a
more general readership.
Europe Undivided is a comprehensive study of the po-
litical development of post-Cold War Eastern Europe that
systematically links the domestic politics of transition with
the politics of European integration. It straddles the (increas-
ingly permeated) dividing line between International Rela-
tions and Comparative Politics and demonstrates convinc-
ingly that we cannot explain the political and economic trans-
formation of ex-communist Eastern Europe without taking
into account the impact of international organizations, above
all the EU.  Nor can we account for the influence of the EU
on political and economic reform in these countries without
an understanding of the political legacies of communism and
the early transition period. In an analysis that covers the pe-
riod from the anticommunist revolutions of 1989 to EU ac-
cession in 2004 and compares developments in six countries
(Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania,
and Slovakia), Vachudova shows how change in the external
incentives (“leverage”) provided by the perspective of EU
membership, on the one hand, and in the political costs of EU
accession conditionality to Central and Eastern European
governments, on the other, initially reproduced “liberal” and
“illiberal patterns” of transformation but finally brought about
convergence toward liberal reform and EU membership.
Europe Undivided steers a middle course between theory
and history. Rather than engaging the great debates of inte-
gration or transition theory, the book focuses on middle-range
causal mechanisms and conditions; and rather than telling
long and separate stories on each of the case countries,
Vachudova provides brief narratives to illustrate her general
arguments.
Vachudova distinguishes two main periods. At the begin-
ning, the fact that Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland had
developed a strong opposition during communism put them
on the track to liberal democracy, whereas Bulgaria and Ro-
mania embarked upon a path toward illiberal democracy.
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not have a major impact on either group in the initial period
(roughly the first half of the 1990s) because it failed to pro-
vide the Central and Eastern European countries with a cred-
ible membership perspective and to differentiate between the
liberal and illiberal democracies during the association pro-
cess. This is what Vachudova calls “passive leverage” - a
somewhat infelicitous term for an EU policy that was not
passive at all but simply did not offer sufficiently high and
selective incentives for change. Under these circumstances,
the illiberal governments were under no pressure to give up
the policies of authoritarian control, ethnic nationalism, and
economic corruption on which their power depended. In the
second half of the 1990s, however, the EU both offered a
credible membership perspective to liberal democracies and
excluded the illiberal democracies from the accession nego-
tiations (“active leverage”). This new policy still failed to have
an impact on the illiberal governments because complying
with EU conditions would undermine their domestic power
resources. Rather, the prospect of EU membership provided
a focal point and a common goal for cooperation among op-
position political forces and the vocal criticism of the EU
weakened the credibility of the illiberal governments with elec-
torates aspiring to EU membership. Both influences helped
the liberal opposition to come to power and to join the liberal
states in the accession process. As the accession process
deepened, the room for maneuver decreased and the poten-
tial costs of pursuing EU-incompatible policies increased. The
result was convergence toward comprehensive political and
economic reform.
Europe Undivided reinforces the “rationalist consen-
sus” in recent publications on the impact of the EU on the
transformation of Central Eastern Europe, which agree on
the crucial causal importance of the credibility of the EU‘s
membership incentives and of domestic constellations and
costs.1 The main theoretical value added of Europe Undi-
vided is the careful specification and combination, from early
transition to EU membership, of external and domestic mecha-
nisms and conditions of variation and change. One factor
stands out: the quality of political competition. It drives the
differentiation of liberal and illiberal patterns of change in the
first period and it is through improving the quality of political
competition in the second period that the EU transforms the
illiberal democracies. I will therefore focus my critical re-
marks on this factor. To begin with, the quality of political
competition is not well-defined. Vachudova puts the main dis-
tinction in the form of a question: “Did the first decade of
democratic government witness the alternation in power of
liberal democratic parties, or the monopoly on power of illib-
eral parties that suppressed political competition …?“ (p. 11).
This definition is actually based on two variables (monopoly/
alternation of governments and political orientation of gov-
ernments) and excludes political systems in which liberal
democratic parties have been in power for a long time and
those in which there has been alternation in power between
illiberal and liberal parties. Later, Vachudova emphasizes that
the “alternation of political parties in power stands out as the
most important” factor contributing to the quality of political
cooperation (p. 14-15) and that the “development of liberal
democracy is not simply a function of having liberal demo-
crats on hand in 1989” (p. 21).
This clarification does not get the analysis out of empiri-
cal trouble, however. The fact that liberal pattern countries
such as the Czech Republic and Slovenia have seen no major
alternation in power for a long time - and less alternation than
illiberal-pattern Bulgaria and Slovakia - obviously contradicts
the argument. By contrast, it does matter who governs. Long
periods of government by the same liberal democratic party
or parties create problems (as Vachudova shows in the Czech
case) but will not lead to illiberal democracy as even short
periods of government by unreformed post-communist par-
ties or nationalist-authoritarian parties inevitably will. Corre-
spondingly, in the second period, it was not alternation as
such that led to convergence but the coming to power of
liberal democratic parties that swiftly introduced political and
economic reforms. And paradoxically, it was by limiting po-
litical competition (on core European rules) that the EU has
made the most important impact on the candidate countries.
Frank Schimmelfennig
University of Mannheim
Note
1 For book publications, see the monographs by Wade Jacoby
(Ordering from the Menu, Cambridge University Press 2005)
and Judith Kelley (Ethnic Politics in Europe, Princeton Uni-
versity Press 2004) as well as the volumes edited by Paul
Kubicek (The European Union and Democratization 2003)
and by Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (The
Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe, Cornell Uni-
versity Press 2005).
Mark Hallerberg. Domestic Budgets in a United Eu-
rope: Fiscal Governance from the End of the Bretton
Woods System to EMU. Ithaca and London: Cornell
University Press, 2004.
IN JULY 2004, the European Court of Justice noted that the
member states are responsible for fiscal policy coordination
in the Council of Ministers. They cannot make up their own
procedures. But, effectively, they can do what they want.
The following March, the ECOFIN Council reinterpreted the
rules for fiscal policy coordination. They cannot ignore the
language of the treaties altogether. But, effectively, they can
do what they want. Or perhaps that is too strong. All mem-
ber states want to treat their economic policies as a matter of
common interest. They all want to benefit from the advan-EUSA Review    Summer 2005   15
tages of coordination. It is just that, for whatever reason, not
all of them are up to the task. Try as they might–and want
what they will–some member states are simply not as good
at balancing their finances as others. Figuring out why that is
so has become one of the major research challenges of the
21st century. Or at least it would have, if Mark Hallerberg
had not written this book.
Domestic Budgets is the right book at the right time. In
cutting through the current controversy (which was only be-
ginning as the book went to press), Hallerberg makes three
powerful arguments: First, budgetary policy is predominantly
a domestic matter, and is largely immune to European influ-
ence; second, sound budgets are forged either via delegation
to a strong finance minister, prior commitment to a specific
distribution of revenues and resources, or some combination
of the two; third, the choice for budgetary strategy is deter-
mined by the structure of political competition in the party
system–and, critically, the same competition may prevent any
meaningful choice from being made or enacted.
These are all credible arguments and they are carefully
made. Hallerberg gives one of the best quantitative and case-
study combinations I have read in a while. The book starts by
setting out the problem, positing the theory, and testing it
against some empirical data (his dependent variable is the
change in the gross debt burden–although much of the narra-
tive is based on cyclically adjusted budget balances).
Hallerberg codes for his own forms of fiscal governance (the
three possibilities listed as his second argument above), and
finds that all three play a role in a determining fiscal out-
comes. Chapter three of the book provides a digression into
the institutional rules for fiscal policy coordination at the Eu-
ropean level–personally I think this could be dropped in the
paperback edition. And the rest of the book offers case stud-
ies of how different types of budgetary regime come to pass
in different countries and with what results. The case studies
are rich with interview data and anecdotes. In his acknowl-
edgments, Hallerberg says that he actually conducted inter-
views in fourteen of fifteen member states. By the end of the
book, you realize that he means it.
This book is very impressive. But is the argument right?
I really want to believe that it is. Nevertheless, I am skepti-
cal–particularly about the quantitative analysis. My biggest
concern is with the choice of dependent variable. Hallerberg
wants to understand how domestic budgets are put together.
The focus of his inquiry is on the relationship between fund-
ing ministries and spending ministries–typically between the
Minister of Finance (who funds) and everyone else (who
spends). His proxy for measuring this relationship is the cy-
clically adjusted budget balance (when he narrates the argu-
ment) and the change in the gross debt burden (when he
subjects the argument to formal analysis). But are these re-
ally good proxies? Probably not.
The big problem is that a large part of any change in the
deficit or in the stock of public debt is due to factors outside
the relationship between the Minister of Finance and the other
parts of government. Cyclical adjustment of the data in order
to reflect what budgetary flows would look like under condi-
tions of trend or potential growth can account for only a small
fraction of the noise. The lion’s share is due to changes in the
cost of debt servicing. As interest payments increase, even
herculean reform efforts can be drowned out. And when
interest payments decrease, even the weakest minister of
finance can earn a reputation for rigor.
Consider the case of Italy. Hallerberg wants to argue
that the political shake-up in 1992 is the watershed for Italian
fiscal policy. Before 1992, Italy operated as a fiefdom with
little or no fiscal control. After 1992, the Italian Executive
became stronger and it delegated significant authority to the
Treasury, which in turn asserted effective control. The re-
sults can be seen in the cyclically adjusted deficits measured
as a share of gross domestic product. From 1987 to 1992, the
deficit moved from 11.6 percent of gross domestic product
(GDP) to 10.9 percent, and from 1992 to 1997, it moved
from 10.9 percent to 2.5 percent. These are not exactly the
same numbers reported by Hallerberg, but we use the same
data source (the European Commission) and any differences
are due only to revisions to the data that occurred between
his writing and this review. And the data seems clear. There
was a fiscal crisis in the late 1980s–during which the deficit
fell by only 0.7 percent–and a dramatic improvement in the
mid-1990s–during which the deficit fell by 8.4 percent.
Once we factor in the cost of debt servicing, however,
the picture becomes more complicated. Because debts have
to be paid, any increase in the cost of debt servicing cuts
immediately into the common pool of resources for the spend-
ing ministries, while any decrease adds to the pool. When
debt servicing costs increase, Finance Ministries have to share
the pain–which is hard. But when they decrease, Finance
Ministries get to share the windfall–or not, if they choose
instead to reduce the deficit and pay down the debt. These
factors are very important in Italy, which has a large public
debt. From 1987 to 1992, the cost of debt servicing rose from
8.2 percent of GDP to 12.6 percent–a drop in the common
resource pool of 4.4 percent of GDP. From 1992 to 1997,
meanwhile, the cost of debt servicing actually fell from 12.6
percent of GDP to 9.6 percent. By implication, the common
resource pool effectively grew by 3 percent of GDP.
When we add these differences to the deficit changes
listed above, the two time periods are close to balance. Fi-
nance Ministers had to rein in the spending ministries to the
tune of 5.1 percent of GDP during the period from 1987 to
1992 (0.7 to reduce the deficit and 4.4 to pay for higher debt
servicing) while they had to rein in a further 5.4 percent of
GDP in the subsequent period from 1992 to 1997 (8.4 per-
cent in deficit reduction less 3 percent in windfall from lower
debt servicing costs). Moreover, these numbers are calcu-
lated using cyclically adjusted balances–which I imagine no
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tries. In straight money terms (current market rates as a per-
centage of GDP), the net consolidation is only 5 percent in
the 1992 to 1997 period and it is 5.7 percent in the 1987 to
1992 period.
We could tell a similar story with respect to Portugal–but
more quickly. During the 1991 to 1997 period, the Portuguese
deficit (this time not cyclically adjusted) declined from 7.6
percent of GDP to 3.6 percent. Portugal still qualified for
participation in the single currency, but that is a different story.
The point is that the cost of debt servicing over the same
period declined from 8.8 percent of GDP to 4.2 percent. The
difference in the deficit is 4.0 percent. The difference in the
cost of debt servicing is 4.6 percent. By implication, Portu-
guese Finance Ministers had 0.6 percent of GDP more to
give away in the common resource pool than at the start.
The obvious solution to this problem is to use primary
balances as the measure of fiscal rigor. The primary balance
measures the ratio of expenditure to revenue net of the cost
of debt servicing. The Commission makes these balances
available both in cyclically adjusted and in straight account-
ing terms. Again, however, such adjustments are only ancil-
lary to the real story.
Compare the Belgian and Dutch cases. Hallerberg iden-
tifies the Netherlands as the ideal case for commitment, with
a strong fiscal reform in the 1980s that carried over into the
1990s. Belgium, by contrast, is less successful–at least until
the 1990s. This judgement does not seem to me to be quite
fair. If we look at the period from 1981 to 1986, the cyclically
adjusted primary balance in Belgium increased from a deficit
of 7.6 percent of GDP to a surplus of 2.7 percent. That means
that Belgian Finance Ministers pulled more than 10 percent
of GDP out of the common resource pool during a six year
period. At the same time, the primary balance in the Nether-
lands increased from a deficit of 0.1 percent to a surplus of
2.3 percent. Dutch Finance Ministers pulled only 2.4 percent
of GDP out of the common resource pool–less than one-
fourth the effort of their Belgian counterparts. So who is
really the more impressive? Moreover, the primary surplus in
Belgium has exceeded that in the Netherlands for every year
since 1986. And this only stands to reason. Domestic budget-
ing is harder in Belgium because they have a bigger debt
problem and correspondingly fewer resources to work with.
Anyone still paying off student-loan and credit card debts
will know what I mean.  Daddy Warbucks may have very
good accountants and he may keep a firm eye on the books,
but he still does not understand real discipline.
Even if the dependent variable is flawed, the argument
remains sound. If you want to control your domestic budget
then you had better have a Finance Minister with a strong
grip on spending, a binding contract, or some combination of
the two. Obviously there are situations in which one solution
works better than another or different actors will not agree
to impose such burdens on themselves. Nevertheless, it is
important to keep in mind that domestic budgets are just that,
domestic. No one from the outside is likely to be successful
in imposing tight controls on sovereign nations. Hallerberg
does us a great service by underscoring this importance of
this reality and by showing how it plays out in countries across
Europe.
Erik Jones
Johns Hopkins Bologna Center
Author’s Response
ERIK JONES’ REVIEW REPRESENTS a careful reading of my book.
He asks quite appropriately whether the argument I make is
right. The EUSA Review Editor has kindly allowed me to
respond to this question. I am not used to the privilege of
responding to reviewers, and in this case (as in most) his
criticisms are quite fair. His critique really has two elements
to it. The first is that I should use primary balances as the
dependent variable. The second is that the analysis pays too
little heed to debt servicing effects. Of course, if one looks at
primary balances one also takes care of the debt services
issue, but one could look at balances per se (instead of pri-
mary balances) as an alternative to changes in the gross debt
burden. In the interests of furthering discussion on this topic,
I discuss his critique below and I consider both issues instead
of one.
The book does have a short explanation for why I use
gross debt burdens. As stated on p. 41, “This measure is
used because it is more consistent over longer periods of
time than changes in the budget balance. States did not nec-
essarily use the same accounting standards to determine their
budget balances, but there are few differences across coun-
tries in measuring gross debt.” Technically, ESA 79 (data I
used for the book) and ESA 95 (latest standard) are sup-
posed to harmonize everything so that deficits and debts are
directly comparable. Yet, as von Hagen and Wolff (2004)
show in a recent working paper, there is not necessarily a
correlation between balances and debt burdens. The reason
they give, and I think they are right, is that Member States
can use accounting tricks to improve their budget balances,
and these tricks are more prevalent when a country nears
3% of GDP. The tricks still show up in gross debt figures,
which are meant to count everything. Their data indicate a
notable decline in the correlation between the two measures
under Stage III of EMU, that is, in the period generally at the
end of the coverage in the book. In earlier periods, such as in
the 1970s, the data for budget balances are less reliable be-
cause countries did not collect data in a standardized fashion.
Given the problems at both ends of the years I cover, I prefer
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Can one still learn something from the budget balances?
Absolutely. They were the primary target in the runup to
Stage III, and I discuss them at length in the case studies. I
suppose I could have also included them in the regressions as
well. In a working paper co-written with Jürgen von Hagen
and Rolf Strauch (2005), we do look at changes in budget
balances with a somewhat different index, that is, one that
measures the extent to which a country is either delegation
or contract/commitment based on the type of fiscal rules it
has in place. We have the strongest results with changes in
the gross debt burden, but we have similar findings with bud-
get balances (significant results, but with smaller point esti-
mates). Moreover, there are other dependent variables I would
think one could examine under this framework. A book manu-
script we are working on that covers the period 1985-04 has
four dependent variables—change in debt, change in balance,
change in expenditures, and economic forecasting errors.
Someone else might want to consider taxation, amendments
to budget bills, exchange rate regimes, or other dependent
variables of interest to examine whether the theoretical frame-
work is of additional use.
Yet the core of Jones’ critique is not that I should have
looked at additional measures, but rather that I should have
looked at balances, and especially primary balances, instead
of changes in gross debt levels.  I have three reasons why I
do not like this alternative measure. First, interest rates on
the debt are largely endogenous to other variables in the re-
gression, and in particular to the budgetary institutions them-
selves. To go back to the Italian example Jones brings up in
his critique, Ciampi’s accession to Treasury Minister, and the
new powers that he brought into office with him (documented
on pp. 191-2 in the book), were responsible for a big dip in
interest rates paid on debt, a dip that took the rates almost to
German levels. Second, as his discussion implies, debt ser-
vicing costs are simply another budget item. Why should they
be excluded from the calculation of deficits and debts while
everything else is included? An economic downturn could
boost unemployment payments, but I would not want to ex-
clude social payments from the analysis because governments
cannot control unemployment rates. Indeed, it is the way that
countries adapt to unexpected changes in their budgetary situ-
ations that represents a key part of the discussion of forms of
fiscal governance. What powers does the finance minister
have to correct the course of the budget during its execu-
tion? Ciampi decided in 1996 not to spend 70 trillion lira in
money that the parliament had authorized because he wanted
to maintain fiscal discipline after seeing how the budget was
performing mid-year (p. 191 of book). His predecessors in
the late 1980s did not have the same ability to make cuts.
Third, if the real issue is debt servicing, one can enter them
directly into the regression as an independent variable. I have
done this for different sets of years when looking at changes
in gross debt levels in unpublished and published work
(Hallerberg and von Hagen 1999). While they generally have
the correct sign, they are not statistically significant, and the
results for the other variables remain substantively the same.
Of course, Jones rightly notes that these regressions are not
in the book. It is a clear oversight that I did not include them.
Mark Hallerberg
Emory University
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We are grateful for all the members of EUSA,
and we especially appreciate those who:
- have EUSA and its Web site (www.eustudies.org)
listed as a resource on their EU-related course
syllabi
- recommend EUSA membership to their students/
colleagues as the key source for the latest ideas
and scholarship on European integration, EU
affairs, and transatlantic relations
- contact the EUSA office for EUSA membership
brochures to take to EU-related events they attend
- list EUSA’s biennial international conference on
calendars of upcoming events and help circulate
EUSA’s call for proposals
- encourage their students to submit paper/poster
proposals for the EUSA conference
- vote in (and run for) our biennial executive
committee election (the next election takes place
in Spring 2007)
Thanks, EUSA members, for your support!18     Summer  2005   EUSA Review
EU-Related Organizations
This list includes independent non-profit organizations,
foundations, and think tanks with a significant EU
focus as part of their missions.
Academy of European Law is a public foundation whose
purpose is to provide law practitioners with both continuing
education opportunities and a forum for debate on EU law.
The Academy holds conferences and seminars in several
European cities and has an office in Brussels as well.
www.era.int
Atlantic Council of the United States has a Program on
Transatlantic Relations that promotes dialogue on the major
issues that will affect transatlantic relations in the near
term, through publications, conferences, briefing tours, and
public events. It also serves as the NATO liaison office in
the U.S.
www.acus.org
info@acus.org
Center for Strategic and International Studies has a
Europe Program for public debate on U.S.-European and
intra-European relations, from the perspectives of nation-
states and institutions such as the EU and NATO. Sponsors
a Euro-Forum and Euro-Focus newsletters, inter alia.
www.csis.org
webmaster@csis.org
Centre for European Policy Studies is a research
institute with a focus on European economic policy and
security policy (including Europe’s external relations).
CEPS sponsors many lectures and fora and publishes many
briefs and reports.
www.ceps.be
info@ceps.be
Council for European Studies promotes the
interdisciplinary research and study of Europe in the social
sciences and humanities. It holds the Conference of
Europeanists, gives pre-dissertation fellowships, publishes a
newsletter, and more.
www.europanet.org
ces@columbia.edu
Europa Grande operates in Spanish, on-line, and is
devoted to information gathering, the commissioning of
studies, and the transmission of information on European
integration and enlargement to policy makers and the
general public.
info@europagrande.org
www.europagrande.org
Europe 2020 is a think tank “for the generations born
since the Rome Treaty,” working with European
institutions, news media, research centers, and others,
providing seminars, fora, position papers, etc., often on-line
(site in French and English).
www.europe2020.org
centre@europe2020.org
European Community Studies Association is a project
of the European Commission developed to be an umbrella
for associations of EU scholars, primarily in EU member
states. It promotes the study/teaching of European
integration and cooperation among its member associations.
It offers technical assistance to associations and organizes
a biennial conference.
European Institute of Public Administration is funded
in part by EU member states and the European
Commission to provide high-level training for public
officials in the member states and candidate countries.
EIPA provides services to develop the capacities of public
officials in dealing with EU affairs through training, applied
research, consultancy and publications, with frequent
seminars in Maastricht and satellite offices in Barcelona,
Luxembourg, and Milan.
www.eipa.nl
eipa@eipa-nl.com
European Union Studies Association is one of the
premier scholarly and professional associations, worldwide,
for all those following EU affairs. With members in more
than 20 countries, EUSA publishes a quarterly journal, a
book series, (State of the European Union), holds
international conferences, gives awards, has member-
based special interest sections, and much more.
415 Bellefield Hall
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
www.eustudies.org
eusa@pitt.edu
Forum Europe offers governments, international
institutions, industry associations, and companies
information and contacts at the senior levels of European
policy making by organizing conferences, high-level
roundtables, working groups, and news media visits, as well
as through its publications.
www.forum-europe.com
info@forum-europe.comEUSA Review    Summer 2005   19
Hellenic Centre for European Studies (aka EKEM) is
an independent research centre focusing on issues
concerning the European unification and the participation of
Greece in the EU as well as general issues that affect
Greek foreign policy. Sponsors research groups,
conferences, various publications.
www.ekem.gr
info@ekem.gr
International Atlantic Economic Society facilitates
communication among economists across the Atlantic,
promotes the field of economics, and fosters the intellectual
development of economists by sponsoring conferences and
publishing articles for international dissemination.
www.iaes.org
iaes@iaes.org
L’Observatoire Social Européen is a research and
infor-mation center that “foster[s] a better understanding ...
of the social implications of the building of Europe.” It
produces books and dossiers, supports original research,
creates training materials, and houses a documents library
for civil servants, journalists, NGOs, policy makers,
researchers, and others.
www.ose.be
info@ose.be
Transatlantic Business Dialogue promotes closer trade
ties between the U.S. and the EU. It is an informal process
in which European and American companies and business
associations develop joint trade policy recommendations,
working with the EU European Commission and the U.S.
government.
www.tabd.com
info@tabd.com
Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue is a forum of U.S.
and EU consumer organizations which develops consumer
policy recommendations to the U.S. government and EU in
order to promote the consumer’s interests; through it, EU
and U.S. consumer groups have input into EU - U.S.
negotiations.
www.tacd.org
tacd@consint.org
Transatlantic Information Exchange Service, also
known as TIESWeb, uses the Internet to promote
transatlantic dialogue on a people to people level. The site
offers a Webzine, subscription to a daily EU news digest,
on-line fora, and much more. TIESWeb sponsors a
conference in Miami in April 2004, “Reshaping
Transatlantic Relations for the 21st Century: The Citizens’
Perspective Reconsidered.”
www.tiesweb.org contact@tiesweb.org
Transatlantic Studies Association, launched in 2002,
focuses on “all aspects of transatlantic studies in all time
periods.” The field is defined as Europe as it relates to
North, South, and Central America and the Caribbean,
including the history of economic, political and security
links, migration, and interdependence. Organizes a biennial
conference.
University of Nottingham
Nottingham, NG7 2RD
England
www.nottingham.ac.uk/hrc/tsc
TransEuropean Policy Studies Association promotes
the study of European public policy, particularly EMU, EU
institutions, CFSP, enlargement, and citizens’ acceptance of
the above. It organizes pre-EU presidency conferences
and links national institutes in member states and candidate
countries. Its members are European institutes and centres.
www.tepsa.be
tepsa@tepsa.be
University Association for Contemporary European
Studies brings together academics researching Europe
with practitioners in European affairs. It is a clearing house
for information on European studies, and promotes
research and the development of research networks
through conferences, workshops, publications, and more.
UACES Secretariat
King's College
Strand
London WC2R 2LS
United Kingdom
www.uaces.org
admin@uaces.org
Young European Federalists is a supranational, political
movement active in most European countries. It is an
autonomous youth organization with no political party
affiliations or commitments; it works for increased
democracy on the federal model, mainly at the EU level
and Europe-wide.
www.jef-europe.net
info@jef-europe.net
Our next compilation of EU-related organizations
will be published in the Summer 2006 EUSA
Review. Send brief details to <eusa@pitt.edu> by
June 15, 2006.20     Summer  2005   EUSA Review
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Publications EUSA News and Notes
EUSA Interest Sections
The European Union Studies Association is happy to
announce its newest Interest Section, the EUSA Public
Policy Interest Section.  EUSA now has eight active
interest sections based on members’ areas of special
interest in European integration, including the aexisting
seven: EU Law; EU Political Economy; Teaching the
EU; EU Latin America Caribbean; EU Economics; EU
Public Opinion and Participation; and EU as Global Actor.
Each section has its own Web pages (with syllabi banks,
textbook lists, and more) and e-mail distribution list, and
all will hold business meetings  at the EUSA Conference
in Montreal (May 2007). For more information, please
visit <www.eustudies.org/EUSAsections.html>.
    To all who participated in the 2005 EUSA
Biennial Conference in Austin, Texas-thanks for
contributing to a great conference!  If you presented
a paper but have not submitted it electronically to
EUSA, please do so as soon as possible.  All papers
delivered at EUSA conferences, eventually going back
to 1991, will be available on the web site of the
Archive of European Integration.  The archive of
EUSA conference papers promises to be comprehen-
sive, so please submit your paper electronically to
pwilkin@pitt.edu or eusa@pitt.edu.
    Please make a note in your planner that the dates
of our 2007 10th Biennial International
Conference in Montreal, Canada, are May 17-19,
2007. We will be at the Le Centre Sheraton in
Montreal and will circulate the Call for Proposals in
Spring 2006.
    Some information about Montreal: Throughout its
history, Montréal has been in turn a French
settlement, a British stronghold and a bilingual city.
Today it is officially bilingual and proud of its status
as the largest French-speaking city in North America
and second-largest French-speaking city in the world.
    Today as you tour the Old Port and Old Montréal,
you'll find that much of what they and their ancestors
built has been lovingly preserved: graceful stone
buildings, stately churches, cobblestone streets...
Elsewhere, historic neighbourhoods are being
restored so more people can live downtown, but it is
being done very carefully so as to preserve the special
character of each area.
New EU-Related Books and Working Papers
Eleni Apospori and Jane Millar (2005) The Dynam
ics of Social Exclusion in Europe: Compar
ing Austria, Germany, Greece, Portugal and
the UK.  Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar
Publishing.
A. Burrell, and A. Oskam (2005)  Turkey in the
European Union: Implications for Agricul
ture, Food and Structural Policy.  Wallingford,
UK: CABI Publishing.
Peter Cameron (ed.) Legal Aspects of EU Energy
Regulation : Implementing the New Direc
tives on Electricity and Gas across Europe.
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Youri Devuyst (2005) The European Union Trans
formed: Community Method and Institutional
Evolution from the Schuman Plan to the
Constitution for Europe.  Brussels, Belgium:
Peter Lang Publishing Group.
Peter Humphreys and Seamus Simpson (2006)
Globalization, Convergence and European
Telecommunications Regulation.
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Michael Keating (2005) Regions and Regionalism
in Europe.  Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar
Publishing.
Donato Masciandaro(ed)  (2005) Handbook of
Central Banking and Financial Authorities
in Europe: New Architectures in the Supervi
sion of Financial Markets.    Northampton,
MA:  Edward Elgar Publishing.
Constantin Stefanou (ed.) (2005) Cyprus and the
EU: the Road to Accession.  Burlington, VT:
Ashgate.
Marc Weller (ed.) The Rights of Minorities in
Europe: a Commentary on the European
Framework Convention for the Protection of
National Minorities. Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press.22     Summer  2005   EUSA Review
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(continued from p. 2) EUSA has had non-US members
since its inception as ECSA in 1988, but those numbers have
grown sharply over time.  The key factors in this member-
ship growth have been the ever-growing appeal of EUSA’s
biennial conferences and the Association’s Olsonian offer
(note that the website trumpets the many “concrete ben-
efits of membership”) of a discounted registration rate for
members.  In recent years the EUSA conferences have
achieved a remarkable degree of parity in participation by
scholars on the two sides of the Atlantic.  By 1995 44% of
the program participants were Europe-based, and this fig-
ure reached 56% in 2005.
Non-U.S. membership in EUSA has grown accordingly,
and it is to be expected that the Executive Committee and
EUSA policy would reflect this trend.  Whereas EUSA re-
mains based administratively in the U.S., the words “of the
United States” no longer appear at the end of the associa-
tion title in brochures or the website.  EUSA is described in
the latest brochure simply as “the premier scholarly and pro-
fessional association, worldwide, focusing on the European
Union.” The Association strives to serve its global member-
ship, which means promoting the study of the EU beyond
North America and recognizing quality scholarship without
territorial restrictions (though with linguistic limits—English
is assumed to be the lingua franca).  The rules governing
several newly launched EUSA awards reflect this fact.  For
example, students “pursuing the doctoral degree (PhD) at
an accredited institution in any country,” as long as they
are “writing a dissertation in English,” are eligible for the
EUSA Haas Fund Fellowships.  Dissertations written in
English on any aspect of European integration submitted in
completion of the Ph.D. at any university are eligible for
The EUSA Prize for Best Dissertation in EU Studies.  All
books in English on any aspect of EU studies and published
in the two years prior to the EUSA Conference are eligible
for the EUSA Book Prize.  And every scholar presenting a
paper at a EUSA conference is eligible for the Best EUSA
Conference Paper Award.
It is important to note that EUSA’s award committees
have not only been willing to consider applicants from be-
yond North America, but have increasingly bestowed their
honors on them.1  EUSA recently awarded its first-ever
book prize to a continental European scholar (Frank
Schimmelfennig), and also named another (Berthold
Rittberger, a German national with a D.Phil. from Nuffield
College, Oxford) as one of two co-winners of its 2005 dis-
sertation award.  The last two Best EUSA Conference Pa-
per Awards have been given to scholars based at the Free
University of Berlin (Henrik Enderlein) and the University
of Lille II (Virginie Guiraudon).  This year’s Haas Fellow-
ship winners are both from universities in the United States,
but both are foreign nationals—one from Turkey (Umut Aydin
of the University of Washington) and one from New Zealand
(Kate Nicholls of Notre Dame).2
The internationalization of EUSA has recently been mani-
fested in other ways as well.  For example, the EUSA Execu-
tive Committee held its annual meeting in Europe (Paris) for
the first time in 2003.  And the next biennial EUSA confer-
ence, scheduled for May 17-19, 2007 in Montreal, will be the
first held outside the United States.
Should the next logical step be for EUSA to hold one of
its biennial conferences in Europe?  That is the sort of ques-
tion that arises in ExCom meetings in this age of internation-
alization.  What do EUSA members think?  We hold our of-
fices because of you and are here to serve you—please do
let us know what you think.
John T.S. Keeler
University of Washington (Seattle)
NOTES
1 For a discussion of more extensive evidence of change in
the balance of transatlantic influence within the EU Studies
field, see my “Mapping EU Studies: The Evolution from
Boutique to Boom Field 1960-2001,” Journal of Common
Market Studies 43:3 (September 2005), pp. 549-580.
2 The Haas Fellowship committee received proposals from
14 students at 10 universities in the United States, 11
students at 10 universities in the United Kingdom, and 7
students at 5 universities in continental Europe.
From the Chair
EUSA Prizes
THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE of the European Union Stud-
ies Association is delighted to announce the winners of
the  2005 Ernst Haas Memorial Fellowship, an annual
fellowship for graduate students conducting EU-related
dissertation research. The Fellowship Fund consists
entirely of member contributions to the Ernst Haas
Memorial Fund for EU Studies, launched in June 2003
to honor the memory of the late scholar Ernst B. Haas.
Winners this year are are Umut Aydin of the  Univer-
sity of Washington and Kathleen Nichols of the Uni-
versity of Notre Dame.EUSA Review    Summer 2005   23
EUROPEAN UNION STUDIES ASSOCIATION
New Individual Membership Form Only (Please type or print)
Name ________________________________________________
Address ______________________________________________
_____________________________________________________
City _________________________________________________
State/Province________________  Postal Code_______________
Country ______________________________________________
Work Telephone _______________________________________
Work Facsimile ________________________________________
E-mail _______________________________________________
Your Professional Affiliation ______________________________
_____________________________________________________
Do you wish to be subscribed to
EUSA’s e-mail List Serve? _____ yes          _____ no
Membership dues (please check as appropriate):
Individual _____ $85 two-year membership
Student* _____ $55 two-year membership
Lifetime Membership _____ $1500 (+ credit for $500 tax deduction)
* Students must provide copy of current semester’s registration form.
EU Law Interest Section _____ $10 (2 yrs.)
EU Political Economy Interest Section _____ $10 (2 yrs.)
Teaching the EU Interest Section _____ $10 (2 yrs.)
EU Latin America Caribbean Interest Section _____ $10 (2 yrs.)
EU Economics Interest Section _____ $10 (2 yrs.)
EU Public Opinion and Participation Section _____ $10 (2 yrs.)
EU as Global Actor Section _____ $10 (2 yrs.)
EUSA Public Policy Interest Section _____ $10 )2 yrs.)
EUSA members may wish to make a contribution to support the work of
EUSA in any amount over membership dues:
EUSA Grants and Scholarships Fund $ _____
EUSA Endowment Fund $ _____
Ernst Haas Memorial Fund for EU Studies $ _____
Total amount of dues and gifts enclosed       $ ________
We prefer payment by check (payable to “EUSA”) when possible.
Checks must be in US$ and drawn on a USA bank. We also accept
international money orders and MasterCard or Visa credit cards. Your
cancelled check or credit card statement will be your receipt.
MasterCard  #  _________/__________/__________/_________
Visa  # _________/__________/__________/_________
Expiry ___/___  Last 3 digits from back side of card ___/___/___
Signature ____________________________________________
Mail or fax this form (please do not mail and fax this form) to:
European Union Studies Association
415 Bellefield Hall
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15260  USA
Facsimile 412.648.1168
EUSA Lifetime Membership
What is it?
Simply put, it is a one-time dues payment
to EUSA of US$ 1500.
What does it include?
The Lifetime Membership includes
all regular membership benefits for life.
Among those benefits currently are
subscription to the quarterly EUSA Review,
receipt of occasional EUSA monographs,
discounted registration rates at the EUSA
International Conference, subscription to
our e-mail List Serve, and the opportunity
to join EUSA interest sections.
Are there any other benefits?
By making a one-time membership
payment, you not only avoid the task of
renewing each year, but gain the twin
advantages of securing lifetime
membership at today’s dollar values and
avoiding future dues increases.
Who should do this?
Any person wishing to support the
endeavors of the European Union Studies
Association—the fostering of scholarship
and inquiry on the European integration
project. For U.S. taxpayers, an additional
benefit is a receipt for a one-time $500
charitable contribution to EUSA, tax-
deductible to the extent allowed by law
(reducing your tax liability for the year in
which you become a Lifetime Member).
How do I become a Lifetime Member?
Simply mail your check, in US$ and made
payable to “EUSA,” to the European Union
Studies Association, address given at right.
(We can not accept lifetime membership
payments by credit card.) We will send you
a receipt and letter of acknowledgment.
Will my Lifetime Membership be publicly
recognized?
Yes, EUSA Lifetime Members will be listed
in the EUSA Review and in our printed,
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Lifetime Membership
$1500 for all our materials, for life, and credit for a one-time tax-deductible contribution of $500
EUSA Grants and Scholarships Fund
to support EU-related scholarship, the EUSA prizes, and travel to the biennial EUSA Conference
EUSA Endowment Fund
to ensure the long-term viability and independence of our non-profit organization
Ernst Haas Memorial Fund for EU Studies
to honor the seminal work of Ernst B. Haas and support dissertation research in EU studies
Your gifts are tax-deductible to the extent allowable by U.S. tax law. Donors of $25 or more receive a receipt
for income tax purposes and will be listed in the EUSA Review. Include a contribution with your membership
renewal, or contact the EUSA Office to make a contribution. Call 412.648.7635 or e-mail eusa@pitt.edu
Inside the Summer 2005 EUSA Review:
“The Magic of the C-Word” Eric Stein 1
Teaching the EU
“Teaching the EU to Europeans: How Can “old” and “new”
Europe be Brought Together?” Eileen Fuchs and Robin van der Hout 7
Book Reviews 12
EU-Related Organizations 20
Publications 21
EUSA Prizes 22
Founded in 1988 (and formerly called the European Community Studies Association),
the European Union Studies Association ® is a non-profit academic and professional
organization devoted to the exchange of information and ideas on the European Union.
How to Support the
European Union Studies Association